TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- BIWEEKLY REPORT 9-22 JANUARY 1993 13TH REPORT

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

REPORT TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs

29 JANUARY 1993

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS This report has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many of the next of kin as feasible.

BIWEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

Period of Report: 9 JAN 1993-22 JAN 1993

1. SUMMARY: During the reporting period, Task Force Russia-Moscow (TFR-M) continued its interview program, sought to develop new contacts, and continued to pursue research agreements with various Russian archives. Task Force Russia-Washington (TFR-W) continued to exploit the "Klaus" files, which are proving to be a premier source for determining what the U.S. Government knew or believed to be true about missing aircrews during the Cold War. TFR-W aggressively pushed for the accelerated declassification of pertinent documents from the "Klaus" files in order to provide the information to the POW/MIA families concerned. While the "Klaus" files offer no "smoking gun" type evidence, they help fill in information gaps and provide a powerful tool to verify data provided by the Russian side of the Joint Commission. TFR-W also published TFR Analytical Paper #1, "U.S. POW Graves on Sakhalin and the Southern Kurils." TFR-W personnel traveled to Beijing to support corollary POW/MIA research efforts and deployed to Ukraine. TFR-W also forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) an inventory of an initial batch of declassified documents from the "Klaus" files to be forwarded to service casualty offices for provision to POW/MIA family members.

2. UPDATE ON ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS:

A. The photocopies of the file cards on U.S. WWII service members who transited Soviet territory which were provided to TFR-M during the previous reporting period consisted of approximately 3,200 documents concerning 2,900 different Americans. The handwritten cards provide a summary of essential information on each alleged service member extracted by Ministry of Defense (MOD) archivists in Podolsk from more than 180 fonds within the Russian (formerly Soviet) Army archives for WWII and the immediate post-war period. TFR-W now faces the labor-intensive task of verifying the identities of the service members, a task which is further complicated by the vague parameters the Russians used in their files review and their decision to err on the side of inclusion--which may mean that many of the names are not of U.S. service members but of other allied or even enemy POWs. Of note, the Russians state that these names are of accounted for, repatriated POWs. While some discrepancies may turn up, an initial survey of the documents indicates that they lend further credence to the conclusion that the Soviets did repatriate the vast majority of

WWII POWs who fell into their hands. Further analysis will be reported in a future Biweekly Report.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 231056Z JAN 93)

B. Russian Ministry of Security representative MG Anatoly Krayushkin verbally reported to TFR-M that Sergei Voronkov, who had sent a letter signed "Jerry Brein" and who claimed to be a U.S. POW held against his will in Chukhotka, was a documented mental patient who had taken the American name from

an evangelist passing through Siberia. TFR-M asked Krayushkin to provide this information in a formal written response.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 220938Z JAN 93)

C. TFR-M re-interviewed Nikolay Dmitreyevich Kazersky about his alleged encounter with an American pilot in the labor camp at Zimka. Kazersky re-examined the photo album from which he had tentatively identified four missing Americans as bearing some resemblance to the man he had known in the camp. Kazersky confirmed his "most likely" candidate.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 221724Z JAN 93)

D. TFR-W deployed two representatives to Ukraine to pursue a report of a former U.S. service member living in the eastern Ukraine. This report had been provided by a Russian emigre resident in the United States. Results of the trip, which begins on 25 January, will be reported in a future Biweekly Report.

E. Next of kin notifications have been prepared for 69 unaccounted-for service members identified on the "List of 510" passed to Senator Smith by the Russians in February, 1992. Most of these notifications have already been forward to the service casualty offices through OSD.

F. 21 documents from the "Klaus" files relating to the 29 July 1953 RB-50 shootdown have been declassified at the request of TFR and have been forwarded to the U.S. Air Force Casualty Office for provision to concerned family members. An index of these documents is provided at Annex C.

G. During the December 1992 plenary session of the Joint Commission in Moscow, the Russian side responded negatively to a list of ten names of former Soviet officials whom the U.S. side had asked to interview. The Russians claimed that the named parties never existed, were not on organizational rolls, were dead, or otherwise could not respond to the interview request. TFR-W has attempted to re-verify the names which the Russians claimed never existed or were not on the rolls. Preliminary research turned up a substantial amount of data on LTG A.M. Dzyza, whom the Russians claimed did not exist. According to Soviet-era publications and sources, Dzyza was a major general and the Deputy Commander for Combat Training of the Moscow Air Defense District by 1970. In 1971, he also headed the Sports Committee of the Moscow Air Defense District. By 1983, Dzyza was a lieutenant general. He was mentioned repeatedly in "Krasnaya Zvezda" ("Red Star") and other military-related publications. On 8 September 1972, Dzyza published an article, "The Commander--Maker of Battle" in "Red Star." TFR-M will bring this information to the attention of the Russian side.

3. INTERVIEWS, CONTACTS AND MEETINGS ATTENDED:

A. TFR-M conducted a telephone interview with and then visited Pyotr Yevseyevich Brayko at Bolshaya Gruzinskaya Ulitsa D.63, KV.113, Moscow (phone: 178-6749). TFR-M contacted Brayko on the recommendation of Nikolay Kazersky, who said that Brayko had served in the prison camp at Zimka as a medic during the period when Kazersky claimed to have come in contact with an American prisoner. During the telephone interview, Brayko stated that he saw no need for a meeting, since he could not recall any American prisoners; nonetheless, he agreed to meet with TFR-M. During the in-person interview, TFR-M showed Brayko the same photo book from which Kazersky had selected four candidates for the man he had met in the camp. Brayko stated that he did not recognize any of the individuals in the photos. He also stated that he did not remember anyone named Kazersky. The only foreigner he recalled treating was a cancer patient named "Berg," whom Brayko believed was a German. Brayko recommended that TFR-M interview Mikhail Sergeyevich Sadekov, who had also worked as a medic in the Zimka camp.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 221724Z JAN 93)

B. TFR-M located Mikhail Sergeyevich Sadekov at Prospekt Mira, D.122, KV.147, Moscow (phone: 286-9380). TFR-M interviewed Sadekov at Brayko's apartment. Sadekov also reviewed the photo book shown previously to Kasersky and Brayko, but, like Brayko, could not recognize any individual, although

he said that one of the men slightly resembled "Berg," the German to whom Brayko had earlier referred. Sadekov provided no information on Americans in the Zimka camp.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 221724Z JAN 93)

C. TFR-M telephonically contacted Galina Yevgenevna Shakulskaya, who lives in St. Petersburg (postal code) 191119, Kolomenskaya Ulitsa, D.23, KV.41 (phone: 812-164-5943). She stated that her uncle, Igor Andreyevich Skvorkin who lives in the Bryansk region, has a neighbor who alleges to have known an American in the Gulag. Shakulskaya said she is not sure of the details, but will be visiting her uncle in the coming weeks and will contact TFR-M if she can gather more information.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 221724Z JAN 93)

D. TFR-M telephonically contacted Venyamin Viktorovich Iofee of the St. Petersburg "Memorial Society" (phone: 812-271-5423). He stated that he and other society members had been approached repeatedly on the subject of U.S. POW/MIAs, but had no records of Americans in the Gulag. Iofee did not offer any information as to who had made the earlier approaches.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 221724Z JAN 93)

4. LETTERS:

A. TFR-M received a detailed letter from Alexander Dmitreyevich Khanutin of Rostov on the Don, Ulyanovskaya Ulitsa, D.32, KV.2 (phone: 8632-62-1337. The letter concerned his WWII era service with the 70th Reconnaissance unit in Hungary during 1945. He stated that his unit picked up several American soldiers. He could not recall any of the names of the Americans, nor did he know what had happened to them after they were turned over to other Soviet Army organizations.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 221724Z JAN 93)

B. TFR-M also forwarded a number of operational letters to the Russian side of the Joint Commission, requesting a records check of the Zimka labor camp files; correspondence on further research agreements; information on the final disposition of the remains of Soviet Army Lieutenant Gennadiy Vasilyevich Mishin, who had been shot down off the coast of Korea by U.S. carrier-based aircraft on 4 September 1950 (the remains had been handed over to the Soviet Military Mission in Japan in March, 1956); and coordination for the continued use of the joint office at Ilyinka 12, Moscow.

(MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 221724Z JAN 93)

5. ARCHIVAL AFFAIRS, RUSSIA:

A. The status of joint research agreements with Russian archival institutions is as follows:

(1). Central State Military Archives (the "Red Army Archives"). The contract for this project was approved and installed in November 1992 for a 60-day trial period. The project is designed to uncover information about U.S. personnel who came under Soviet control following the Red Army's liberation of POW camps. The initial project will end in January 1993, with a written report due from the Russian archivists in early February 1993. The need for a continuation of this effort will be assessed based upon the February report.

(2). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. This project was also negotiated in November 1992 and designed as a 90-day trial effort. The project focuses initially on WWII and comes forward to 1973, covering the period of all unresolved Cold War shootdown incidents. Formal execution of the contract was delayed, however, due to the need to resolve transfer of payment issues. Despite the lack of a finalized contract, the Russians have begun work on the project. A written report, scheduled for mid-February, will probably be pushed back to a later date.

(3). Central Historical Documentary Collection (formerly called the "Special Archives"). This archive includes the records of the Office of Repatriation from the WWII-era. The research project was initially designed to focus on the repatriation of U.S. service members from liberated German POW camps. Due to a complex relationship between this archive and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a formal contractual agreement has been delayed; however, the archive is proceeding with the research on the assumption that outstanding financial issues will be resolved. The work in this archive is also scheduled for completion by mid-February.

(4). Military-Medical Museum, St. Petersburg (subordinate to MOD). The staff of this museum has produced a substantial number of documents for TFR, although a contract still has not been negotiated for a formal effort.

6. SIGNIFICANT CONUS ACTIVITIES:

A. As noted above, TFR-W focused on archival research and the effort to have pertinent documents declassified so they can be made available to concerned family members.

B. TFR-W also published its Analytical Report #1: "U.S. POW Graves on Sakhalin and the Southern Kurils." Future analysis will, as a rule, be published separately from the Biweekly Reports. This first report, consisting of 16 pages, briefly examines the history of the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories and Sakhalin, then reports the progression of recent events that culminated in the Russian side's suggestion that we stage a joint expedition to investigate the claims that U.S. WWII POWs under Japanese control were killed and buried at those locations. The report contains a detailed analysis of the issue and examines the practical difficulties associated with the proposed expedition. It contains all of the information available to the U.S. side at this time.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. TFR-M vigorously pursue the issue of Korean War-era transfers of U.S. POWs to the former Soviet Union with the Russian side, insuring that the Russian side understands that the U.S. side expects a formal, detailed response to the document summarizing the evidence on this subject that was passed to the Russian side during the December 1992 meeting of the Joint Commission.

B. TFR-M press for further information on each of the Cold War shootdown incidents given special attention by the Russian side at the December 1992 meeting of the Joint Commission.

C. TFR-M invite the Russian side to send one-two individuals to CILHI in late February 1993 in order to orient them on U. S . remains recovery and forensic procedures (NOTE: this action has been coordinated with the appropriate agency by TFR-W).

D. All concerned U.S. parties prepare for an expedition to Sakhalin (delaying any deployments to the Southern Kurils until we have tested the veracity of the Russian claims about POW graves on Sakhalin), stressing to the Russian side that (1) a small-scale preliminary expedition is desirable to determine the merits of the allegations prior to the dispatch of a full-scale recovery expedition, and (2) weather permitting, the initial expedition should be conducted prior to the April 1993 Moscow meeting of the Joint Commission.

E. TFR-M immediately pursue the review of the Air Defense Command "yearbooks" in the Podolsk archives.

F. The U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission should visit the newly-independent Baltic states in route to Moscow in April for the purposes of (1) thanking the local governments for their support of the Joint Commission's work, (2) seeking high-level support and publicity for the continuing search for information on U.S. POWs who were transferred to the former Soviet Union, and (3) pursuing individual leads that have emerged in the Baltics. These stops are deemed especially desirable in light of the extremely positive reception and attendant publicity accorded Ambassador Toon during his December

visit to Ukraine.

ANNEX A TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA REPORT FOR 29 JAN 93

SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting, 16 Dec 92; Joint U.S. Russian Commission On POW/MIA Affairs

A. Morning Session.

1. The Russian side, as host, opened the morning session at the Roskomarkhiv building at Ilyinka 12, Moscow. MG Anatoly Krayushkin of the Ministry of Internal Security of Russia observed that there was a need for both sides to determine what the future work of the Joint Commission should be, after which he reviewed the working schedule for the day and opened it to suggested alteration by the U.S. side. The U.S. side did not request any changes to the schedule.

2. The first substantive remarks were by Lieutenant-Colonel (LTC) Osipov, General Volkogonov's assistant (General Volkogonov was not present at the Working Group meetings). LTC Osipov first addressed a list of ten names which the U.S. side had submitted prior to the meeting with a request to interview each of the ten during the session. LTC Osipov claimed to have established that, of the ten names, four (Churkov; Grigoryev; Ivanov, A.; Dzyza) did not exist on the pertinent rolls, three (Ivanov, T.; Babenko; Peregudov) were dead, one (Lebedev) had no relation to Vietnam as claimed by the U.S. side, and, of the two still living (Leonov and Scherbakov), both were on pension and the Russian side was trying to find them. LTC Osipov promised to attempt to arrange meetings with the two pensioners, when they were located. [The "List of Ten" came from TFR-M Correspondence #37, submitted to LTC Osipov on 4 November 1992. The contents were reconfirmed prior to the December Plenary Session through Colonel Saxe of Task Force Russia-Moscow. Three of the names were provided by Senate staffers; the other names originated from interviews conducted by Task Force Russia representatives in Moscow]. LTC Osipov then noted that Colonel (retired) Orlov and Colonel (retired) Korotkov, both of whom had been interviewed previously by TFR, would attend the meetings, as well as two correspondents with pertinent backgrounds (Khrekov and Privalov). [In the course of the session, one of the journalists, Mr. Privalov, appeared briefly and spoke with Mr. Al Graham of Task Force Russia. An agreement was reached to schedule his interview for the latter part of December]. LTC Osipov then noted that, although Air Defense General Abramov, whom the U.S. side had requested to meet, was alive and well, he lived forty kilometers from Moscow and found it difficult to attend the meeting. Mr Kauzlarich of the U.S. Department of State then asked about Major Amirov, whom the U.S. side had also requested to interview in person. LTC Osipov responded that Amirov was living in the vicinity of Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk), but did not seem to be at home. LTC Osipov stated that a member of the Working Group might be able to meet with Major Amirov in the future, but LTC Osipov could not say when. LTC Osipov then returned to the "List of Ten," stating that the head of the personnel division of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, with access to all of the old KGB files, had checked the list and could answer any further questions. MG Krayushkin closed the discussion on this topic, noting that most of the people on the "List of Ten" were generals and that, "I can assure you, we don't 'lose' generals."

3. LTC Osipov then addressed the plan for the next day's Plenary Session, observing that the Russian side was almost done with the WWII document search, stating that, from a search that involved more than 23,000 names, a list of 733 had been derived of those who had not transited the former USSR as part of the general POW repatriation. LTC Osipov stated that this list would be submitted to the U.S. side the next day and that every name had been checked individually. On the subject of Korea, LTC Osipov stated that the document with 53 names which had previously been submitted to the U.S. side had been the result of a page by page search of the military archives. He then noted that some additional names had since surfaced and promised that the U.S. side would receive these names the next day. On Vietnam, LTC Osipov stated that no new documents had been found. On the Cold War shootdowns, LTC Osipov stated that new data had surfaced on a few incidents involving U.S. aircraft, notably on the 29 July 1953 "Sanderson" case. LTC Osipov stated, "We also found a few documents on Mrs. Reynolds's quest...we have complete data as to air border incidents--violations--whether the aircraft were shot down or not. There are also Politburo reports on the incidents. We will give you these document, too. Now, as to what we [the Russian side] want to hear: We would like to know the results of your inquiry into the issue of our

POW's in Afghanistan, what was done concretely with your institutions in this search? Senator Kerry promised to work on this, and [Secretary of the Army] Stone promised to work on it with military intelligence. We want to clear up this matter before making additional future plans. What future results do you anticipate?"

4. MG Krayushkin, reassuming the role of moderator, asked the U.S. side for its response. Mr. Kauzlarich replied, thanking LTC Osipov and noting that he had helped the U.S. side prepare for the next day's Plenary Session by providing these details. Mr. Kauzlarich then said, "Today's discussion should provide more information on what we want on Korea and the Cold War. Ambassador Toon will pass the data we have on the Afghanistan issue. Today, to jump right in, we have just had Senate hearings on POW's--the Senate was, by the way, very pleased that General Volkogonov could come to the U.S. His testimony was very powerful and he impressed many with his honesty and desire to help out. Coming, as it did, on Veteran's Day, his testimony had a very strong effect and served as a reminder that the American public hag this very much on their minds--but it also put more pressure on our side to resolve this problem." Mr. Kauzlarich then noted that the American public would not understand it if the Joint Commission did not obtain specific results on individual cases. He then stated, "Our interest is purely humanitarian. What were the fates? We have no interest in intelligence information. We are interested in the fates of individuals buried in the former USSR and in the return of their remains. If any Americans are still alive, we want to try to make contact with them." Mr. Kauzlarich then briefly described what had been done by the U.S. side with archives and interviews. Next, Mr. Kauzlarich said, "I would like to raise two points this morning, the Cold War incidents and the issue of the transfer of U.S. Korean War POW's to the former USSR. I will ask Mr. Ross and Mr. Quinn to go into the details. But first let me offer a few general observations. We gave you a great deal of detail on ten Cold War Shootdowns--names, places, dates, dates of birth, types of aircraft--when will we get information to resolve any of these cases? In Ambassador Toon's letter to General Volkogonov, we made clear that this was a specific objective. This is a clear-cut area. We know these aircraft were shot down. If the crew members died, tell us so. If they survived, what happened to them? On the Korea question, we believe we should be making more progress. The information available from your side and from the U.S. side presents a compelling case that U.S. prisoners were transferred to the USSR. We need to address this directly. You said there were no archival findings to indicate that this occurred. In that case, how can we do interviews most effectively? How can we approach this problem most effectively? After your response, I'd like to turn this over to Mr. Ross and Mr. Quinn."

5. MG. Krayushkin responded, "I think our approach is based on full recognition of our humanitarian purposes. At the beginning, there were problems when talking about POW's and so forth, but in the course of open discussions, we gave you all the information we found on U.S. citizens. I am sure my Russian colleagues' presentations are not based on the old image of-the enemy but on humanitarian concerns. Speaking of the KGB Archives, we did not find problems, and we gave you what we found, since the Minister of Security supported this. As we have told you, some U.S. citizens live here, but not former prisoners of war. Some are ready to talk to you, while some are not. But only one or two do not wish to talk to you."

6. LTC Osipov stated, "Unfortunately, the Russian side has no data from the U.S. side on American Korean War POW's, on how many whose fate is unknown. Our data says it was not more than three thousand in all, yet you say that more than two thousand may have been transferred to the Soviet Union? Now how many are we searching for? Seven Hundred, perhaps? Or one or two? There is a difference."

7. The representative from the (former) KGB Archives stated, "We passed all the information we had on POW's from Korea, we know of 530 persons, of whom 23 were without nationality." MG Krayushkin interjected, "but discuss the 'transfers.'" The KGB Archives representative stated, "This didn't happen--there are no documents, no data. Of the U.S. POW's of whom we knew, none were transferred to the Soviet Union."

8. Mr. Mazurov of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service stated, "We've been working on this since March, and surely our American partners remember on March 26 to 29 when two women from the U.S. side said they had data on U.S. POW's sent to the USSR--if you have these documents, give them to us so

we can use them in our search. Further, given your own dialogs with the Chinese and Vietnamese, you should know they said they never transferred any POW's to the Soviets. If your POW's were transferred to the USSR, what is your evidence? We need this information to direct our search."

9. Mr. Kauzlarich responded, "We want to get to that, of course. It's a good question. But can we start with the Cold War?" The Russian side agreed. Mr Kauzlarich then noted, "But we have to watch the clock so as not to shortchange Korea." After a brief discussion, during which the Russian side suggested dividing the Working Group into two to address the Korean and Cold War issues simultaneously, the two sides agreed to remain in a single group. Mr. Kauzlarich then turned the floor over to Mr. Ross of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

10. Mr Ross stated that he was glad to be back in Moscow, then began his formal presentation. He stated, "Mr. Clift presented information on the Cold War incidents last time--this morning he's meeting with Ambassador Toon and Mr. Ladygin. The Cold War offers a unique opportunity to resolve the fates of individuals in 10 incidents in which the Soviet government was involved. We have made limited progress to date, but we think there is room for immediate success. We have given you information through meetings and through Task Force Russia. We were given evidence that there are two sets of remains, one from 1952 and one from 1960. On the April 1955 [June 1952?] incident, you confirmed that this was a shootdown case when we only suspected Soviet involvement. Colonel Osipov already said that we will receive new information from General Volkogonov tomorrow. Now I'd like to review the status of specific cases for the purpose of shedding light on how to focus:"

a. Mr. Ross stated: "On 7 October 1952, an RB-29 was shot down over the Sea of Japan. The remains of Captain John R. Dunham were recovered, a headless corpse--n

b. LTC Osipov responded, "No, that isn't exactly right. This document was signed by Dunham from the office of intelligence, from the U.S.--"

c. Mr. Kauzlarich interjected, "Still this is of the utmost concern to US. As far as the U.S. government is concerned, if you can repatriate Dunham's remains, the case is resolved--and if there is no information on the other two crew members."

d. Mr. Ross resumed, "On 1 July 1960, an RB-60 was shot down over the Barents Sea. The remains of Eugene E. Poza were recovered. A document of 17 October 1960 indicated that a skeleton with documents and ID was that of Poza. There were two survivors, and one set of remains has been repatriated. Once Poza's remains are identified and repatriated, this case will be considered closed."

e. Mr. Ross thanked the Russian side for the information provided on the fate of the U.S. B-47 shot down near the Kurils on 17 April 55. He noted that a report from a fishing boat claimed its crew saw the plane explode.

f. Mr. Ross then discussed the 29 July 1953 shoot down of an RB-50 off Vladivostok, noting that the U.S. held contemporary reports of Soviet vessels in the area. One survivor from the downed aircraft had been rescued by the U.S. Mr. Ross stated his belief that it should not be difficult to resolve this case. He said that the Russian side needed to confirm or refute U.S. suspicions on further survivors. Mr. Ross, in an aside, thanked the Russian side for the hospitality extended to Mr. Bruce Sanderson, son of one of the missing crew members from this case.

g. Mr. Ross next addressed the 8 April 1950 downing of a PB4Y Privateer over the Baltic Sea. He thanked the Russian side for arranging an interview with the Air Defense Officer (Retired General Shinkarenko) who had been in command of the Soviet aircraft involved in the downing, noting that, according to the Soviet officer's report, the aircraft had gone down in a ball of flames and that there were no possible survivors. Mr. Ross noted, however, that this Soviet officer had remarked that the Soviet Air Force always produced a "Lessons learned documents in the wake of such an incident and that copies of these texts were always forward to Moscow. The Russian officer had noted during the interview that the KGB did the same thing through their parallel reporting network. Mr. Ross stated that the U.S. side would

like to see those reports in order to confirm or deny whether any crew members had survived. Mr. Ross acknowledged that some of the information contained in these reports might be considered sensitive, noting that the U.S. only desired those portions of the texts that dealt specifically with U.S. servicemen on board the aircraft. Mr Ross noted that General Shinkarenko's former assistant, Colonel (Retired) Ryzov, also claimed that much information was available in the Air force Lessons Learned files. Both General Shinkarenko and Colonel Ryzov stated that, while the local files had been destroyed, copies of all relevant documents would have been forwarded to Moscow for filing and that, today, the Moscow copies would be the only ones in existence.

h. On the 13 June 1952 downing of a B-29 over the Sea of Japan, Mr. Ross stated that the U.S. side was grateful for the documents which confirmed Soviet involvement, but he also raised the contradiction inherent in the Soviet press '9 initial report of a lone survivor, which was later retracted. These reports, Mr. Ross noted, led the U.S. side to believe that more information was available from the USSR government's archives.

i. On the 2 September 1958 downing of a C-130 over Armenia, Mr. Ross stated, "We contend that reports on the investigation of the crash site would help resolve it."

j. Mr. Ross next raised the 1951 downing of a P2V Neptune and the 1956 downing of an RB-50, both lost over the Sea of Japan. He stated that the U.S. side had discovered new information in its own archives of Soviet involvement, and that any information from the Russian side would be appreciated.

k. Mr. Ross then raised the case of the downing of an RB-57 over the Black Sea on 14 December 1965, stating that initial Soviet representations showed an awareness of the loss. He asked if the Soviets had conducted search and rescue operations, and, if so, with what results?

11. Mr. Ross then summarized the U.S. position on Cold War incidents, stating that the U.S. side understood the official Russian position that no Cold War survivors were held against their will on Russian territory. He noted, however, the U.S. side could not yet rule out the possibility that a service member had been forced to renounce his citizenship and was now afraid to surface. Mr. Ross stated, "We have said again and again that the most important goal is to find the living, next, to obtain remains. The information received shows that the Dunham and Posa cases provide excellent examples of how to show progress, instead of just searching archives." Mr. Ross then described the need to search records to identify crash sites as exactly as possible then to excavate them, which could provide evidence. He stated that the U.S. side hoped that, in the future, the Russian side would provide such assistance, remarking that, "Mr. Quinn can tell you how we did this in Vietnam. Even after thirty years, Vietnam still has a wealth of information." Mr. Ross then said that he would stop at that point in order to save time for other scheduled presentations.

12. Mr. Krayushkin said, "In the view of the [Russian side of the] commission, Cold War incidents could be the top priority...I think the [simultaneous] meetings of Ambassador Toon with the Ministry of Defense and Ladygin may help. We've worked for one and a half hours already--I recommend a break...but [I see] the representative of the Ministry of Defense--n

13. LTC Osipov then took the floor in place of the MOD representative. LTC Osipov said, "I am prepared to make a report on the eleven Cold War incidents and can say there were not eleven, but more--but this needs one hour, and, since we have practically nothing to say on Korea...or perhaps we could divide into groups, Cold War and Korea?" Mr. Kauzlarich responded that the U.S. side was concerned with "Our Universal Ten." Mr. Ross said, "Yes, there are more cases with Soviet involvement, but they've been resolved. We are only interested in those ten." LTC Osipov responded, "Yes, there were incidents. Also, our planes were shot down--can the Americans tell us about the fate of our pilots? In Alaska, for instance..." MG Krayushkin asserted his role as moderator and stated, "I propose not to divide, because it would be better to keep the exchange of information from all of the different institutions involved." MG Krayushkin then declared a fifteen minute break.

14. Upon the resumption of the Working Session, MG Krayushkin declared that LTC Osipov would give

information on the crews of the aircraft involved in Cold War shootdowns. Mr. Kauzlarich raised the point that, if the Russian side had information on Soviet planes shot down, the U.S. side would be more than ready to help resolve the issue. Mr. Kauzlarich stated that this was the first time he had heard of this issue. LTC Osipov said, "There were not only shootdowns--a representative of the military will give you information--we also had a missing military attache." LTC Osipov then turned back to the Cold War shootdown of U.S. Aircraft, stating "it's up to you to decide, I can speak about all or only your Ten." Mr. Ross said, "Only ours."

15. LTC Osipov stated:

a. "On the 8 April 1950 Baltic case, we have practically all of the communications documents. It starts with the Air Defense Forces on the violation, then there is the declaration of the Commander of the Regiment on the shootdown order. There are after action reports from the pilots, and, finally, the Chief of the Operations Division, Fleet representatives and a representative of the Politburo--Andropov--signed documents on this." LTC Osipov then read from the purported Politburo document: "A U.S. RB-29 on 8 April 1950 violated the air border of the USSR and was shot down, burned in the air and broke apart. On the crash spot, there was an oil slick and some debris was seen. Boats tried to find the site, but found nothing and no crew members." Osipov observed, "This was reported to Stalin personally, so you know it's true. I must repeat: All crew members perished."

b. LTC Osipov stated, "Then there is the 7 Oct 1952 downing by the island 'Yuri.' We now have a report on the violation of the border, the names of the pilots who intercepted [the aircraft]--I ask the MOD representative to check if these pilots are still alive. Now here is the description: The plane was shot down at 500 meters, 12-15 kilometers south of Yuri. The plane burned when it was hit and exploded on the water. The Border troops checked the spot and found bits of debris and the corpse of a pilot without a head, with a parachute and 10 aluminum balloons--maybe these were mistaken for heads? The corpse had the identification of John Robertson Dunham. All of this was given to the KGB representatives on land. Further, in the reports to Stalin, all documents contain the same thing: We found a piece of a document with the signature 'Captain James Smith, Intelligence, U.S.'" Mr. Kauzlarich then asked, "What about the body?" LTC Osipov responded, "We are trying to find out what happened to the body. But there were no survivors.

c. LTC Osipov stated, "Regarding the incident of 25 July 1953 near the island of Askol [as heard] near Vladivostok--this is the Sanderson case. Besides the documents we already handed over, we found one more document, the report of Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov to Bulgarin. The document says, 'This certifies that the aircraft was shot down...but no corpses or survivors were found by the border guards. The incident occurred 55 kilometers southeast of the island Askol.' LTC Osipov further stated that the Russian side had found the name of the pilot involved in the shootdown, but that, "Thirty-Five years have passed and it is hard to locate him." LTC Osipov continued, "We know that U.S. aircraft were searching. Our border guards boats were also in action. But, besides one person rescued by the U.S., nobody was found. Our navy has radio intercepts: At 20 o'clock, 24 July, an RB-29 informed its base that he found pieces of debris and a life boat. Two U.S. destroyers and other vessels were nearby. Our own navy found nothing. But we need to investigate further, to try to find the pilot."

d. LTC Osipov said, "On the 18 April 1955 incident in the Kuril Islands, there is no doubt that the aircraft was shot down. Actually, this took place at an altitude of 12,000 meters, near Cape Kronitsky, Kamchatka. The U.S. plane opened fire and ours responded. At 1150, the plane disappeared in the clouds. A Soviet fishing boat eight miles away saw an explosion--this information was written up in a document dated 23 April 1953. No pilot or border guard saw anything else. We also found the name of a Soviet pilot who participated--we're trying to find out if this pilot is still alive--but I emphasize that the pilot did not see anything."

e. LTC Osipov stated, "Regarding the 2 September 1958 incident near Yerevan, there is no doubt that the aircraft violated the air border and was shot down. It did not follow the order to land. There are, though, some differences in the number of corpses found. With the help of the military archives, we received data on the examination of a corpses found on the crash site. There are physician's certificates saying that the

remains of the crew, the burned parts of corpses, showed seven people. We will give you the documents, but it's difficult to clarify everything. Identification was impossible, due to the damage from the burning and separation. It's mere information. During the examination, and there is some confusion on this, two more corpses may have been found, a Paul Duncan, number A0961 and a pistol were found on 4 September 1958, two days later."

f. LTC Osipov stated, "On 1 July 1960 over the Barents Sea there was a violation of the air border. This is detailed--two members of the crew, John Ritter is alive...also, Olmstead is alive. All were repatriated, this is certified. That's all?"

16. MG Krayushkin asked if there were any questions. Colonel Herrington of TFR asked the following: "On the 13 June 1952 RB-29 shootdown over the Sea of Japan, the documents you gave us were helpful. They said your search showed no debris, no survivors. We passed these documents on to the family members. Since this incident is similar to the 29 July 1953 incident, on which you have extensive files, we would appreciate it if, on behalf on the families, you could give us a full set of documents on this shootdown--after a security review, of course--because, unlike the Reynolds and Sanderson cases, on which there is a lot of documentation, these families have only the one piece of paper you gave us. Please help us help them." LTC Osipov responded, "We don't have any secret documents; these have all been declassified and most were transferred to you. But others will be given to you tomorrow."

17. Mr. Ross addressed the 1 July 1960 case, stating that, "You spoke of two live people--the names don't match--there are still 3 unaccounted for, including Major Posa." LTC Osipov responded, "I understand. Perhaps the ministry of Security can answer." MG Krayushkin said, "Those documents were given to you from the archives of the KGB. They spoke about six crew members, two alive. Our research confirms they were turned over to the U.S. side. We gave you the reports on the incident and the findings, also the documents on the returns. As to the remains of Posa, a Murmansk trawler found the remains. There is a description of their state when found one month after the crash. We are looking to find out the disposition in the archives of the Murmansk KGB, GRU, and in the Special Department of the Northern Fleet for Counterintelligence. In the archives we have found nothing to date, so we asked the Murmansk KGB and Fleet Counterintelligence about it, who signed the reports to the center, but they didn't know anything about the fate of the remains. In fact, we received a negative response just this morning before the beginning of the meeting. So we must think about other steps." Mr. Kauzlarich responded that this was a good example of how to research, asking the Russian side to please show the U.S. side all documents discovered. Mr. Kauzlarich then asked if the session could shift to the subject of the Korean War POW's. MG Krayushkin asked if the representative from the Military Archives might first be given the floor.

18. Colonel Victor Mukhin form the MOD Archives stated, "Osipov said it all. We're working on this issue. At today's meeting of Ambassador Toon with the Minister of Defense, maybe they can speak about it. While the U.S. gave us the names of the pilots in whom they are interested, we found a number of incidents not mentioned on your list. We will continue our work. Of course, as an archivist, I hope our work will be two-sided. We want documents from the U.S. side on our Afghan vets, on aircraft we lost in the Arctic. Now it's no secret that Soviet planes were flying right alongside American planes. Soviet aircraft were monitored by U.S. radar. It would be very interesting if the U.S. side helped in this research, and we are prepared to provide you a list of incidents. Now as to the question of Soviet military advisers--we had them in many countries around the world, and we don't know about some of their fates. Also, some non-military personnel went missing, such as our two journalists in Yugoslavia and a specialist in Yugoslavia. Then there is the matter of our submarine which went down on 11 March 1968 in the Pacific for unknown reasons. The registration number was PL274. Now we know that, on 17 March 1968, the U.S. submarine "Seavers" [as heard] had put into harbor at Yokasuka, Japan, and was being repaired by night. The periscope was bent 45 degrees. Perhaps there was a collision? If so, we would like the documents on this collision. In August 1974, the CIA-built U.S. submarine "Glomar Explorer" recovered our submarine or parts of it. Robert Gates told President Yeltsin about it and gave evidence, a video tape, the flag. But documents are better for archivists."

19. Mr. Kauzlarich stated, "Please give us a document with a list of requests." Colonel Mukhin answered, "We will make an official request." MG Krayushkin asked, "Are there other questions?" Mr. Kauzlarich

continued, "We are ready to help. We would welcome visitors. But we assume you are also humanitarian in your concerns and not looking for intelligence." MG Krayushkin stated, "Mr. Zaporochenko of the border guards archives would like to speak."

20. Zaporochenko gave a series of quick, vague reference to written communications on B-29-related incidents south of Cape Valentine and off Cape Saysura (as heard) in the early 1950's including a response to the Council of Ministers. He offered no detailed information. Zaporochenko also noted that a journal excerpt had been found on the border violation incident in the Caucasus involving a plane with a crew of seven, including one George Kapelson (as heard). Zaporochenko implied, but did not firmly state, that these documents would be passed to the American side.

21. MG Krayushkin said, "Let's move on to the Korean War." Mr. Kauzlarich recognized Mr. Quinn, but Krayushkin said, "There are some people here to whom you might want to put questions, or you can read from your statement." Mr. Kauzlarich asked, "Are they here now?" Krayushkin said, "Of course." LTC Osipov rose to his feet and said, "We present Professor Alexander Semyonovich Orlov who is a retired Colonel of Air Defense troops and can address aircraft issues but also U-2 issues, and retired Colonel Gavrill Ivanovich Korotkov, who was the political officer who did Korean analysis on Americans." Mr. Kauzlarich asked, "Do they have statements?" Colonel Korotkov responded, "I have already said everything in interviews. LTC Osipov noted that, "Korotkov is also a leading expert on the Korean War." Krayushkin said, "Perhaps they can say a few words after all."

22. Colonel (Professor) Orlov spoke first: "In March, 1951, I was with a group of 64 persons, students at the Foreign Language Institute. I was sent to Korea, to the 64th Air Corps. During the war, I eventually graduated from the School of Radio Interception. I knew English, and worked interception and deception. In March/April of 1951, there were heavy dogfights between the MIG-15's and the F-86. We worked on radio intercepts, since there were some aspects of the situation we did not understand. Above all, we wanted to know about the American special high-pressure flight suit and the like. Well, I was sent to Andun, in China. Then, in May of 1951, I was sent to Korea, to the Headquarters of Kim Il-Sung. I participated in the process of interrogating U.S. prisoners of war. That was in the area of Pyongyang. I must say, we were forbidden direct contact with U.S. POW's. We worked by handing in written questions. I must say, my participation in this lasted about three months. I had only two cases of direct contact with U.S. POW's. First, there was LTC Black, a USAF member of an aircrew as a staff representative. A newspaper article was published in Pravda on 12 August 1951, based on an interview with Black. I had some involvement with Black at that time and so I know his name. I don't recall the name from the second incident, but the interrogation had to do with aircraft plans and tactics. Of course we knew about the U.S. POW's in Korean camps, but I didn't know the locations. The Koreans held them. We asked only tactical and operational questions." Orlov and Korotkov then exchanged brief pleasantries, after which Korotkov spoke.

23. Korotkov stated, "In 1950 I was sent out from the Moscow School of Military Interpreting to the Far East, which was then under the command of Marshal Malinovsky. As a professional, it was my work to analyze all sources of intelligence that came to us about U.S. Forces in Korea. I did this work in the course of the years 1950 to 1953. I was stationed in Khabarovsk, that was my workplace, and we sent our products to Moscow--those documents may still be here--and, by the nature of our work, most of the reporting came from POW's. Now with the Chinese and the North Koreans, our relations were not all that clear--they tried to restrict the Soviets. But, in two cases, I had direct contact with American POW's. The first instance was with a pilot whose last name I do not recall. I had 150 questions prepared for him. I asked him these. We sought information on concrete things, on tactics and so forth. We weren't concerned with social issues." At this point, the representative of the Foreign Intelligence Service observed, "For us it was just the opposite." Korotkov continued, "Our work fell under the jurisdiction of the Main Military Council."

24. LTC Osipov interrupted to say, "We found the results of Korotkov's work--we've got 109 names of U.S. participants, but we don't know their fates." Mr. Kauzlarich asked, "Are these new names?" Osipov answered, "Honestly, I haven't cross-checked them yet." Kauzlarich: "And these were all interrogated?" Osipov: "It's different." At this point, Colonel Mukhin of the MOD Archives intervened, saying, "Excuse

me, but the Main Political Administration and the Main Staff of the Air Force were involved. The names came from Chinese radio, from Korean colleagues and the like. We know, for instance, what some pilot said about his aircraft, and there's some personal data." Mr. Quinn asked, "Were all 109 alive?" Osipov answered, "From 1951 onward, these 109 were in prison in Korea. Some of them died." Orlov said, "I have a question for the Americans. According to your information, Robert Frank Futtrell (as heard), an American author, said in 1983 that 249 U.S. pilots were prisoners, and that 35 remained after 1954, while the others were repatriated. He also said that 6 pilots were captured on the ground and returned after the war. So we are only concerned with 35 people, right?" Mr. Quinn responded, "Let me make a statement, then we should break for lunch. It's a useful opportunity to talk with people who were there. There are questions about who might have been moved where, to the USSR or elsewhere. Earlier, Mazyrov asked some tough, good questions. Back in the USA, he'd probably be a congressman or a lawyer." At this, Mazyrov smiled and said, "And I'd still be an agent of Russian Intelligence."

25. Mr. Quinn continued, "We put together a document on all of the information we have on Korea--we've translated it into Russian, and we're xeroxing it now--sorry we don't have it this morning. It includes our own intelligence reports back to 1952. There are refugee reports, POW reports from third parties, reports from Gulag inmates. There are references to press articles. There is even information from the National Security Advisor to President Eisenhower. It refers to Major Amirov and to other statements from the past year. I don't say all of these reports are absolutely true, but it's clear that, when people in Congress and in our country read this, they're going to say it's a compelling case--that it happened. We must look into this to the best of our abilities and with an open mind--and do it together. We'll give it to you this afternoon, then, based on Ambassador Toon's agreement with General Volkogonov, we can decide how the Task Force representatives can work together. Now, two or three words on Vietnam. We had a good session in September. Your diplomats who appeared were helpful. We reached agreements in Vietnam on archives, we received other information, as well as access to prisons. We went into more than ten prisons. When you think of the hatred that existed because of the War--that's considerable progress. We also got access to Ho Chi Minh's Tomb--You recall the reports of POWs held there--You gave us the first confirmation of the structure--the plans would be very helpful. Also, with Vietnam, we were able to clarify the fates of 150 U.S. servicemen in just the last 8 months by going out and interviewing people familiar with this case. There were high-ranking and low-ranking soldiers, civilians, a prison guard even told us of a revenge execution of one U.S. prisoner in retaliation for a South Vietnamese execution. I told Congress about that--and there was no recrimination against Vietnam. It happened in the war. It was tragic, but it was in the past. This openness has resulted in us moving closer in our relations with Vietnam. Just two days ago, President Bush announced the relaxation of business restrictions. Until the twentieth of January, when President Clinton takes office, there's a great chance to move further. Can you help us? General Abramov, for instance. Can we talk to him? Maybe we could clear up one or two more cases. At the last meeting, the GRU representative said he could provide reports from the Hanoi resident, which was an impressive offer. Also, we asked you about a proposal for the foreign affairs newsletter to employees and so forth, something to see if anyone else knows anything about Vietnam. Perhaps they could recall questionnaires from Vietnam similar to those from Korea?" At this, Col Mukhin said quietly, "We have no such thing." Mr. Quinn concluded by saying that, "These are areas when you could be very helpful."

26. MG Krayushkin stated, "We will concentrate on your requests. Now let's take a break. Can we split up afterward? What does the MOD representative think?" Colonel Mukhin said, "I said everything I have to say." Mr. Kauzlarich said, "Thanks for the session." Krayushkin asked Osipov, "Shall we split up?" Osipov said, "Is an hour and a half long enough? All right, we'll resume at 1515. Then we will present these two persons [Orlov and Korotkov] and a journalist." The session recessed for lunch.

AFTERNOON SESSION, 16 DECEMBER 1992.

27. While nearly all of the U.S. representatives returned for the afternoon session (Mr. Kauzlarich was absent, due to a conflicting requirement), less than half of the Russians returned. Essentially, the specialists who had concluded their reports did not return.

28. LTC Osipov opened the session, remarking that the journalist, Grekov, who had been scheduled to

testify, had not shown up. He noted that other members of the Commission had also had to leave, but that no testimony was lost thereby. He commented that, among the other reports the journalist had, there was one of 7 "Negroes" spotted in Astrakhan, but LTC Osipov offered no further details. He opened the floor to questions for Orlov and Korotkov.

29. Mr. Quinn said, "Back to the statement about numbers by Colonel Orlov--could you clarify the U.S. pilot numbers you stated?" Orlov responded, "According to official U.S. figures, the U.S. Air Force lost, in all, 1729 airmen. Of these, 1144 were killed, 306 were wounded, and thirty were missing. In all, 249 pilots were prisoners. 214 returned after the cease fire. 35 remained unaccounted for. Therefore, I think you must know this. It is information from Robert Futtrell, from his work The U.S. Air Force in Korea, 1983, second edition." Mr. Quinn said, "There are various ways of accounting for POW's.n Orlov responded, "Naturally," Mr. Quinn continued, "But "killed" does not necessarily mean you're certain in all cases or that bodies came back, and you still want to confirm that they died. Perhaps this is an opportunity to learn from you on this. It's a privilege to learn history first-hand. Can you describe what it was like where you were? Were you in a camp that was only Soviets? Were there Chinese? North Koreans? Were U.S. Pow camps nearby?"

30. Orlov stated, "We were in Andun, in China, next to the Korean border. At this airport, in March, 1951, there was the 324 Fighter-aviation Division. This was in China, and they flew MIG- 15's. It was the only airfield in China with Soviet aircraft. The air battles were especially intense in April of 1951. The B-29's were bombing the bridges through which the Chinese troops moved into Korea--the Soviet aircraft were tasked to defend the bridges. Our number one enemy was the B-29. But the B-29 was slow, so it was easy for the MIGs to shoot them down. So F-84's started to cover them. The F-84's were also not a great threat, because the MIGs were better, but, in December, 1950, the F-86 appeared. It was based on the design of the Messerschmidt-262. The Sabre and the MIG were equals, but the U.S. pilots were more experienced and they had high-pressure uniforms. They also had radar-assisted aiming, but the MIGs had the advantage of being closer to base."

31. Mr. Quinn asked, "How far from the border was the airfield?" Orlov: "Five to seven kilometers." Quinn: "And the U.S. planes bombed you?" Orlov: "No, but they blocked us from taking off." Quinn: "A number of MIG-15's were lost to the F-86, weren't they?" Orlov: "Yes, we lost some in heavy fighting. But some Sabres were also shot down." Quinn: "It was important to the MIG pilots to know as much as possible about U.S. jets?" Orlov: "Of course. We needed to interrogate these pilots. Before, when it was only the B-29 and F-84 and F-80, we had no need to interrogate them. I was a radio intercept, but I was used as an interpreter." Quinn: "To get information from the pilots, someone needed to ask the questions. Who was that?" Orlov: "When we arrived at the Headquarters of Kim IL-Sung, we gave the list of questions to the 64th Air Corps, then to Colonel Petrachov (as heard). He looked for the answers--he is dead now." Quinn: "To whom were the questions given?" Orlov: "To the B-29 crews, but, especially, to the Sabre pilots. We would question several pilots, then compare their answers." Quinn: "You gave the questions to other countries." Orlov: "To the North Koreans, in English. Only a few of the Koreans could read English." Quinn: "Then what good were the questions to the North Koreans?" Orlov: "They took them to the Americans. They had a group of English speakers, but only a few." Quinn: "You know the location of the pilots?" Orlov: "No. I only know that the camp was nearby. I know there was a camp at Semgisu (as heard) near the Korean border with China. I heard about it." Quinn: "A Soviet unit interested in collecting information and using it against U.S. aircraft--" Orlov: "The 64th Air Corps studied all of the information, such as that on radar-assisted aiming. In turn, we built a radar system, 'Siren,' to disrupt the U.S. system. We got answers back in a day or two. Then I translated the information from English into Russian. There were names, units, personal identification numbers, rank, date of birth, and so forth. This was all given."

32. Mr. Quinn then turned to LTC Osipov and asked, "Colonel Osipov, have you searched for this information?" Osipov responded, "We gave you all of that, plus there's a bit more that we found this month. We will give it to you. For instance, there is something about the B-29 with the number 462252, from the 307th Aviation Group." Colonel Herrington asked, "When was it shot down?" Osipov continued, "And there is a complete description of the air fight." Orlov said, "I was one of the first who did this work. We had only name, unit number, his grade at first." Mr. Quinn asked, "But none of the English

language papers survived?" Orlov: "I don't think SO." Osipov: "There are some document drawings made by the pilots themselves--no guarantees, but I think we gave you some of them." Orlov: "We didn't have originals, I did this for three months in Korea, but did radio intercepts before and after. I was working on the radar-assisted aiming problem." Quinn: How many reports were there a day?" Orlov: "Hard to say, but, at the start of the war there were few prisoners. Maybe we got one to three reports a day. We didn't know how many people they actually questioned--we just wanted the answers. We compared the answers." Quinn: "You asked questions until you finally got some people worth questioning further." Orlov: "We wanted concrete information. Whoever answered better received more and deeper questions." Quinn: "Wasn't there a time when some people really worth talking to turned up, who you would ask to see?" Orlov: "First of all, it was forbidden. Secondly, our specialists verified it in case it was disinformation. The North Koreans maintained strong effective controls." Quinn: "What about other Soviet elements?" The KGB?" Orlov: "You know, there was a great deal of secrecy in the 1950's. We didn't know what the KGB was doing." Quinn: "General Volkogonov told the Senate that it was 'irrefutable' that the KGB interrogated U.S. POW's in Korea." Orlov: "I can't say. I didn't know. I can only talk about what I saw." Quinn: "What about your contacts with North Koreans and the Chinese?" Orlov: "At Andun, we lived in old Japanese barracks, with all Chinese service. Then, on Kim Il-Sung's staff, there were only Koreans. There were caves to hide in during air attacks. We had three small houses." At this point there was some slight confusion between Mr. Quinn and Orlov as to where and when Orlov had actually served. After clarifying this matter in consonance with the statements he offered above, Orlov indicated he was prepared to take further questions. Mr. Quinn asked, "In China, you wore Chinese uniforms--is that correct?" Orlov: "Yes, but without insignia." Quinn: "And in Korea?" Orlov: "The same Chinese uniforms."

33. At this point, Colonel Korotkov asked, "Maybe I could speak?" Mr. Quinn responded, "I thought we should do one interview, then the other," then he turned back to Orlov and asked, "Would the Koreans have allowed you to talk to U.S. POW's?" Orlov: "I didn't want to. Anyway, they only would have done it after a long agreement." Quinn: "How would the North Koreans dare to treat the Soviets so badly?" Orlov: "I was low-ranking. The bosses--there were lots of chiefs--made the decisions. Relations were official, there was no friendship. The guys with the big shoulder boards decided everything. And we had no base in Korea, just Kim's Headquarters. It was in a forest in a valley. I don't remember the name, it was so long. We just called it Kim Il-Sung's Headquarters."

34. Colonel Korotkov drew a hasty sketch showing how his responsibility overlapped geographically with Orlov's. Korotkov said, "Orlov went from China to Korea and back to China. I was in Khabarovsk. I was able to go to Korea once, but it was not linked with the interrogation of POW's. In Khabarovsk, we had a great collection of specialists who knew different languages. There were more than fifty people. They spoke French, Turkish, all the languages for the U.N. troops. We got information from POW's, from Americans, from the English, and so forth. Our mission was to do a political assessment of the U.N. troops in Korea. Our commander was a member of the Military Council for the Far East, and he got permission from the Koreans and the Chinese for meetings. I don't know how it worked, but the many specialists each had two or three meetings, so about one hundred POW's were interrogated. It happened in an area in the mountains where the border wasn't marked. Pilots were moved there by their guards. We went to Posyet, south of the lake country, where Korea, China and the USSR come together. We were definitely not in China--It was either Korea or the USSR. A female captain of the border guards took us there. She wore green tabs. I wore a Soviet captain's uniform."

35. Mr. Quinn asked, "What was special about these prisoners?" Korotkov responded, "We wanted to get first-hand information. And, although it wasn't a critical issue, we tried to turn them." Orlov interjected, "You can use them for propaganda." Korotkov continued, "but I know of no case where an American had been turned--but Japanese, Turks, yes. They did radio broadcasts, or they wrote leaflets and so forth. I had close relations with the Koreans. Captain Pak Sin Kun (as heard) had a Soviet uniform and spoke English, Russian, Chinese--he had power. But General Volkogonov was right when he said POW's had contact with the KGB. In Khabarovsk, I knew the KGB representative, since our work was related. There was this Soviet citizen of Korean origin, general Kan--"

36. Colonel Herrington asked, "Would it surprise you, Colonel, if I told you that none of our repatriated

POW's referred to such a trip to the border?" Korotkov: "I don't know where they came from, some camp..." Herrington: "But none were repatriated. Where did they go?" Korotkov: "I never got any information on that." Herrington: "Isn't it possible that they were taken by the special services into the USSR?" Korotkov: "I think the possibility exists." Herrington: "And what about the reports that U.S. POW's were taken through the USSR to Sweden?" Korotkov: "I heard rumors that U.S. POW's were repatriated through the USSR to Sweden. But I had no facts." Herrington: "Specifically those you worked with?" Korotkov: "No. Others." Major Peters of TFR asked, "Colonel Korotkov, did you ever hear anything about U.S. POW's being held or interrogated in a KGB high security facility in Khabarovsk?" Korotkov: "No. The special services never said anything. It was all very secret."

37. At this point, LTC Osipov and Krayushkin announced that they had to leave, due to conflicting appointments. Mr Quinn asked if there was any problem with continuing the session without them, since it was of great interest to the U.S. side. The Russians agreed the session could continue, and Orlov and Korotkov remained behind, seated at the center of the table, with a single representative of the GRU, Captain 2nd Rank Sevets, seated further down the Russian side of the table.

38. Colonel Herrington stated, "We have a problem and we need your help. It's possible that some of our aviators were taken to the USSR and never came home. As intelligence officers in the Cold War and under Stalin, you know that this makes sense. If we had the opportunity to get Soviet pilots from Korea, we would have done it. We even tried. In '51, '52, '53, and '54, were received a large amount of information describing a system to take our POW's to the Soviet Union--from Russian sources, from Japanese prisoners who were released, from Germans who came out in 1955." Korotkov: "It's not a secret." Orlov added, "It's not a secret, but you still need documents." Herrington: "Yet the archives say it was against the rules. But the participants say it happened." Orlov: "Saltykov-Shchedrin [19th century Russian novelist] said, 'The harshness of Russian laws is softened if you don't execute them.'" Herrington: "We have learned from research that, just because it's not in the archives, it still might have happened." Orlov: "A question about these pilots. Maybe there were special cases. But a regular pilot, why take him? We held German engineers. and it's a paradox--the experience of our own Soviet aviators wasn't studied, it was classified. Therefore, or course, we would have done it. But we didn't educate our own military very well."

39. Colonel Herrington said, "You both said how important POW pilot interrogations were. You described how, from 1950 to '53, there was a secret war with Soviet participation. We know Moscow was worried that the USA would confirm Soviet involvement. So a POW interrogated by a captain in a Soviet uniform doesn't go back, it's a one-way trip." Orlov and Korotkov both nodded slowly and said, "Yes." There appeared to be a visible effect of this logic on Korotkov, as though he had not previously followed this chain of logic through to its end. Herrington continued, "This explains why we have no POW memories of such interrogations. You say it was common knowledge--How many POW's, just an estimate, moved along this pipeline?" Korotkov: "I don't know exactly. Maybe tens of Americans. Of course, we had other specialists, for other countries. But, of the Americans, maybe tens." Herrington: "The most important thing is not the numbers, but to establish that it was done." Korotkov: "We never knew the numbers, but we knew things were happening. I don't exclude the possibility that U.S. POW's were transferred. If you took all of our specialists--up to ten Americans, that's what I think." Herrington: "And those ten could have gone to the USSR?" Korotkov: "I don't exclude it."

40. The security services representative interrupted, asking Korotkov, "Why do you think that? What's your evidence?" Korotkov responded, "I want to clarify. We served in the Armed Forces. We carried out orders. We did not know or care how many prisoners were handled. About the other services..." Orlov stated, "My experience all had to do with U.S. technology: Parts, aiming systems, G-suits, all were shipped to the USSR. I think if we had gotten an important specialist, an aviation engineer or a designer, he would have been sent back--But a common guy? To train someone as an agent, you could have just taken some infantry officer. Of course, the KGB may have had other requirements." Herrington: "What about the rail and ship transport rumors? Did you ever hear of prisoners shipped through Khabarovsk or Posyet?" Korotkov: "No. I never heard of shipments through Khabarovsk, that's out of the question. But Posyet, that's possible. Posyet is a closed facility. Khabarovsk was too open. But maybe Ussurysk?" Herrington to Korotkov: "The rule was that, in the war zone, you wore a Chinese uniform. But you were

in a Russian uniform--doesn't that indicate to you that you were on Soviet territory?" Korotkov: "Possibly. It was mountainous, there were trees. You couldn't see the border as such."

41. Colonel Herrington asked, "What about Lieutenant-Colonel Black?" Korotkov: "That was Orlov." Orlov: "The name came up because of the newspaper interview. Three years ago, in 1989, I worked on the Yakovlev Commission. It had to do with the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact. Everyone said, 'How can you say this happened? There is no documentation.' But we said there were oral reports and so forth. Finally, the documents were found. Now, on Korea, we all say it happened. But where is the document? The 1989 experience says we have to continue to search, and, sooner or later, it will surface." Quinn: "What would you do to find the answer?"

42. Korotkov: "I must start a long way away. For five years, I've worked on a book on Korea and Stalin. I've seen the plan for strategy in the war. I see that Stalin was the initiator of the war. But I still have no access to key documents--I have a list here in my case, but--to your question. I would have started at the bottom, with the KGB documents from the Primorskiy Krai and Khabarovsk. I'm convinced the names are there. And those reports went to Beria, they're in Moscow. You shouldn't be looking with us, with the military men--we are honest in saying we didn't know. Concerning people and their fates, search with the KGB." Herrington: "How would they have been processed? Would they have been given different names? Would they have been fingerprinted?" Korotkov: "I'm talking about people in general, not Americans. In those years, all our services wanted as much information as possible, and, of course, the U.S. was the priority. Any opportunity to get information was valuable. I think the system was such: first try to turn him, then scare him, then put on pressure. Maybe appeal to his material interests. Changes of name were common. We have a saying, 'He comes into prison as Ivanov, but dies as Petrov.' I'm sure 'Sanderson' or a 'Johnson' would have died under a different name." Orlov: "I, too, want to stand up for the documents of the Armed Forces. It wasn't military people who did this. But, on the Cold War, if we're talking about air defense incidents or reconnaissance, your start should be with military documents. But if you're looking for people, go elsewhere--our documents talk about aircraft."

43. Colonel Herrington asked, "Do either of you know Major Amirov?" Korotkov: "No." Orlov: "From Vietnam?" Herrington: "No. I'll tell you what he said. He said he interviewed a former KGB official in Kazakhstan who claimed involvement in the transport of U.S. POW's to Kazakhstan. It was interesting, because we had information of POW's in Alma-Ata." Orlov: "It's tough to say. This is third-hand information." Korotkov: "I think it's a mistake. I think they were talking about South Koreans." Herrington: "Why not Americans?" Korotkov: "Of course, it wouldn't be a bad idea. Kazakhstan's far away from Moscow. It's the best place for a camp." Herrington: "Have you ever heard of 'windows' opening up on the border?" Orlov: "No." Korotkov: "I heard about it. Traffic on the border was easy. They passed weapons, medicine, personnel." Herrington: "Let's speculate. since we have so many reports coming from Germans, from the Japanese, of pilots in the Gulag with other foreigners who might be released and tell tales--" Korotkov: "We think it looks strange now. But thirty years ago nobody would have thought the information would get out. Anyway, most people died."

44. Major Peters then raised various possible rationales for taking U.S. Korean War Era POW's to the USSR, such as the successful Soviet experience with German and Japanese POW's, who turned out to be superb bargaining chips. Observing that even the best bureaucracies make mistakes, Peters asked if the KGB might not have misjudged the Cold War relationship with the U.S. in light of previous successes with POW's, taking a number of POW's to exploit for information then hold as potential hostages only to find out that they, the Soviets had a liability on their hands which had to be disposed of. Orlov responded that the Germans and Japanese had been taken in masses, and that, had the Soviets tried to use U.S. POW's on construction projects and the like, the international scandal would have been too great. Peters clarified his remarks, saying that he did not mean that U.S. POW's had been used as general labor, but that the KGB or other organs of the Soviet government might have viewed then as potentially valuable bargaining chips. Orlov responded, "During the Cold War, When we shot down planes, the crew members became bargaining chips--Khrushchev, for instance. In the 1960 Barents Sea incident, two pilots survived. Khrushchev let them go because it was a smart political move. Remember the U-2 flight, and the shoe-banging at the United Nations. Well, he tried to use the prisoners to build bridges. It was a good political move. But that was in 1960. Your model is logical. But there are no facts." Herrington said,

"But Stalin advised Mao to hold back twenty per cent of the U.S. prisoners." Orlov: "It was a good idea for China." Korotkov: "And it was an even better idea for Moscow."

45. Mr. Quinn asked, "Have you ever heard any reports of U.S. POW's in the USSR?" Korotkov: "Yes. It was a discussion between specialists shooting the breeze, and that's how the Sweden thing came up. Some POW's would stay, some would go to Sweden." Quinn: "If this had happened, wouldn't a bunch of people have heard of it?" Orlov: "Yes." Korotkov: "Yes, it would have leaked out." Quinn: "Would people today be willing to come forward?" Korotkov: "I think there are still people who know things but who are afraid. You will face that." Orlov: "There's another difficulty. Today, some people will say anything you want to hear." Quinn: "We realize that. Is it possible some POW's renounced their citizenship?"

46. Korotkov, with some visible emotion, stated, "As I knew U.S. officers--even privates--and I knew them well-- they proved to be great Americans. Patriots--even in the Gulag these men would not have given up their citizenship. Their mood made me think they were assured, cocky, convinced that someone would come and get them. Among specialists, we discussed how difficult it was to work with the Americans. The tone of our conversation was that Americans were very self-assured, they never gave up hope."

47. Orlov stated: "I came across Americans in Poltava in World War II. We worked very well together. My opinion of Americans was that they were great boys. But, as POW's, not all Americans answered questions willingly. That forced us to distribute the same questions to many. During the Cold War, I had contact with pilots, and Americans held themselves with pride and dignity surpassing valor. Even [Gary] Powers--I was in the courtroom--In the U.S. he was treated as a hero and he was buried in Arlington Cemetery--That's why Americans are self-assured, why America deserves such respect. After fifty years, you're still searching--and we also know Americans are only convinced with facts."

48. Korotkov stated, "I can assure you that you will find these facts here "

49. Colonel Herrington stated, "I have a young man who phones me twice a week, asking about his father. Bruce Sanderson--n Korotkov nodded and acknowledged that he knows Sanderson. Herrington continued, "He and other family members ask twice a week--with so many aircraft shot down, with the quality of our ejection seats, lifeboats, and so forth, isn't it impossible that there were no survivors? Isn't it also logical that such prisoners, too, were taken alive? Do you think there were survivors from the Sanderson flight?"

50. Korotkov responded: "I only know from second hand. We were shocked that a big American aircraft, with 15 people on board, was shot down right after the Armistice. The rumors in Vladivostok were that there were survivors--there were no facts, but, in talking, we [specialists] came to the same conclusion, that all might have survived, because of the quality of the rescue equipment these pilots had." Orlov interjected: "They even had a beacon." Korotkov continued: "When we found out it didn't explode, that it just went down slowly, it was reasonable to assume they all bailed out near the Bay of Peter the Great, not far from Posyet. It's a comfortable place, with no big waves. We assumed the Americans had been rescued. I'm confident that all of the information is in Vladivostok. For your mission, I'd start there on this case." Herrington: "We're going to Posyet tomorrow." Korotkov: "Great. You could surely find some people who witnessed the whole thing."

51. At this point, the session had run approximately two hours longer than scheduled. Mr. Quinn made closing remarks, stating that the U.S. viewed this work as a humanitarian action to heal wounds. He stated, "We are always grateful for acts of friendship that help us find out what happened to our service members. Thank you, and please pass on any further information, it would be an act of great kindness."

52. Korotkov said, "Just let me reassure you that some of us really do want to help you. We have long since freed ourselves from our old preconceptions about Americans. Anyway, I have long respected my American colleagues, and you represent those Americans. We will pass you anything we find--and I'm sure we'll find something."

53. Mr. Quinn then turned over a stack of copies of TFR's summary of supporting data for the belief that

U.S. POW's were transported from Korea to the former USSR. Colonels Korotkov and Orlov expressed an interest in obtaining a copy of the document, and U.S. Navy Lt Tabach insured that the Secretary of the Russian side, Tatyana Koltovich, openly handed one copy to them on the spot.

54. This transcript was prepared by a Task Force Russia officer with a high fluency in the Russian language who attended the working group session and took extensive, near-verbatim notes. It was then reviewed by other TFR personnel who were present and who are conversant in the Russian language. All paraphrased remarks are accurate in full detail as heard, while any portions of the text given in quotation marks are considered to have been recorded with a fully-reliable level of accuracy.

ANNEX B TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA REPORT FOR 29 JAN 93

SUBJECT: Transcript of the Plenary Session of 17 December 1992 of the Joint U.S.-Russia Commission of POW/MIA Affairs

1. On 17 December 1992 the Joint U.S.-Russia Commission on POW/MIAs met in plenary session at the ROSKOMARCHIV building at Ilyinka 12, Moscow.

2. The session began at 1009 Moscow time with non-substantive opening remarks by General Dmitri Volkogonov, followed by corresponding remarks by Ambassador Malcolm Toon. General Volkogonov briefly reviewed the session's schedule, which was accepted by Ambassador Toon, after which General Volkogonov began his official statement.

3. The highlights of General Volkogonov's presentation were as follows.

a. General Volkogonov stated that the highlight of the two month period since the last meeting of the Commission was clearly his own appearance before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on POW/MIA Affairs in Washington, D.C. He stressed that this was a matter of profound import not only for the United States, but for Russia, as well. He stated that he deeply appreciated his reception by the SSC, and that the importance of this exchange of views led him to convene a full assembly of the Russian side in Moscow upon his return.

b. General Volkogonov outlined three formal Russian positions:

(1) As he stated before the SSC, there are no U.S. citizens held against their will on Russian soil.

(2) The Russian side had succeeded in confirming the fates of the more than 23,000 U.S. WWII POWs who transited Soviet soil in the process of their repatriation.

(3) The Russian side had determined that, despite the denials of each Soviet leader from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, the POW problem exists today and there is a genuine need to clear up the issue of Cold War shootdowns. General Volkogonov stated the Russian side itself had questions about this.

c. General Volkogonov emphasized that "not everyone in Russia has a positive attitude toward the work of the Commission, due to the legacy of old totalitarian thinking and the enduring image of the enemy, from which these individuals still cannot free themselves."

d. He stated that the resolution of the POW question is not only a U.S. issue, but of moral importance for Russia, and that there is an ongoing battle for human rights and over the issue of the importance of individual fates.

e. General Volkogonov repeated for emphasis President Yeltsin's statement, as delivered to the SSC in Washington, that there were no U.S. citizens held against their will on the territory of the former USSR. At this point, Ambassador Toon asked for clarification as to whether General Volkogonov meant the entire territory of the former USSR or only Russia. General Volkogonov replied that he could only speak with complete certainty for Russia, but that he believed the situation was the same in all the other

republics. He further stated that, before President Yeltsin signed this statement, General Volkogonov met with the heads of all the ministries and agencies which might have had knowledge of such matters. The responsible agencies had to submit both written and verbal reports certifying that no U.S. citizens were held against their will. Ambassador Toon then asked if it would be possible to receive copies of these declarations. General Volkogonov replied that these were working documents, not in a condition to be published, but that if Ambassador Toon wanted them, they could be provided. Ambassador Toon responded that these documents would be useful to him in his travels around the U.S. to meet with the American people.

f. General Volkogonov said that the Russian side had identified some U.S. citizens who reside on former Soviet soil voluntarily, some of whom had requested political asylum in the past. He stated that a list of these individuals, with addresses, would be passed to the U.S. side.

g. General Volkogonov stated that President Yeltsin had decided to show mercy to a U.S. citizen currently imprisoned in Russia for an attempt to smuggle icons out of the country. As soon as the investigation and necessary judiciary matters are concluded, this U.S. citizen will be released.

h. General Volkogonov stated that the U.S. side now has received the pertinent data on WWII POW repatriations and that these issues had been addressed in conjunction with the issue of the 730 U.S. air crew members interned on Soviet soil during WWII.

i. General Volkogonov underlined the difficulty and importance of resolving the outstanding questions as to the fates of U.S. air crews shot down during the Cold War.

j. General Volkogonov said that, as a component of the WWII research, a total of 733 persons emerged whose fates were not immediately clear. Ambassador Toon asked if that meant their fates had not yet been determined. General Volkogonov replied that he had meant that their fates previously had been unclear, but that now they were considered clarified, that they had transited the USSR in the repatriation process. Colonel Osipov, General Volkogonov's aid, then volunteered that this number referred to POWs who had been taken ill or suffered wounds and who had been hospitalized, therefore delaying their repatriation. General Volkogonov resumed his remarks, saying that these POWs had been returned to the U.S. some months later than the majority of the repatriated POWs. He then noted that some limited numbers of personnel had disappeared in transit from the war zone, that some had died on Soviet territory and been buried, while still others had perished earlier in the German POW camps and been buried. General Volkogonov stated that some questions remain to be resolved as to the precise locations of a number of these graves.

k. General Volkogonov stated that, on the issues of Korean War and Vietnam War U.S. POWs, the Russian side had unearthed no useful information. He stated that he wanted to underline that no related incidents took place on Soviet soil. The Russian side would, however, hand over additional information on camps and numbers of prisoners in the war zones. He noted that, in 1953-54, the Repatriation Commission documented that most POWs returned home. He said that some had, however, died in the POW camps. He stated that the Russian side had gone through the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and had surfaced the names of 109 U.S. POWs held by the combatants, noting that the interrogation reports on 70 service members had already been handed over. General Volkogonov then passed a number of documents to Ambassador Toon. General Volkogonov then stated again that he had no kind of data on U.S. Korean War POWs on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

l. General Volkogonov said that, in more than three months of work in the Russian Presidential Archives, he had found nothing on the POW issue, although he had unearthed much material on matters such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Katyn Massacre.

m. General Volkogonov said nothing new had been found on the subject of Vietnam era POWs.

n. General Volkogonov repeated his remarks made before the SSC on the 9 U.S. Vietnam era deserters who transited the USSR in route to other countries.

o. General Volkogonov then turned to the matter of Cold War shootdown incidents. He stated that the Russian side had unearthed some supporting data which would be passed to the U.S. side this day. He stated that much remained unclear regarding the 1953 shootdown incident near Vladivostok, offering that in the course of the next day's trip to Vladivostok the matter would be addressed. He stated that he had telephoned the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet and asked him to check the local military archives, since the fishing fleet, whose trawlers may have been near the scene, had no pertinent records. General Volkogonov stressed that this incident required further investigation, stating that he had asked Afanasyev and Krayushkin (Security Service) to check their agencies' archives. He said that this was not a closed question, and that the Russian side would continue to work on some incidents, especially this one.

p. General Volkogonov then shifted to the issue of former Soviet prisoners held in Afghanistan. He stated that the Russian side was grateful to the U.S. side for its assistance in searching for Russian POWs. He stated that "these are real people imprisoned for more than ten years in Afghanistan." He noted that he had spoken with Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Scowcroft during his Washington visit and that he had requested their help. General Volkogonov stated that "we know that you have influence over some of these groups even now." He stated that he believes this influence will be used to free the Russian POWs and that the U.S. willingness to cooperate on this issue was impressive.

q. General Volkogonov stated that he especially wanted to thank U.S. archivists for their help.

r. General Volkogonov noted that, while the information delivered by the U.S. side on Cold War incidents should help clear up the fates of the air crews, additional information on the Korean War issue would be helpful to the Russian side.

s. General Volkogonov then began concluding remarks, stating that, although some individuals might be disappointed with the results attained by the Commission to date, these would only be people who were uninformed on the matter. He said that it was noteworthy that the Commission's work went on during a period of severe internal conditions and turmoil in Russia, and that, despite the current struggle over the course of reform, President Yeltsin had decided to continue this effort, considering it a matter of honor. General Volkogonov noted that he had personally dedicated all of his strength to answer those questions still unresolved. He then offered to take questions.

4. Ambassador Toon asked if there were any POWs among those former U.S. citizens who had chosen to remain in the Soviet Union. General Volkogonov answered that there had been service members, but no POWs. General Volkogonov then orally reviewed a list of ten former U.S. citizens who had chosen to remain in the former Soviet Union, noting that only one had been a U.S. service member and that had been a defector, not a POW. Ambassador Toon then asked if the Russian side had clearly ascertained that all of these individuals wished to remain on the territory of the former Soviet Union. General Volkogonov stated that this had been confirmed, noting that one woman even made frequent visits to the U.S. He noted that these requests for asylum and defections had generally taken place at the height of the Cold War period, when the political environment had been very different. He said that most had asked for asylum in the 1950's and were old people now, and that some of them were even dead. Ambassador Toon thanked General Volkogonov for the documents handed over by the Russian side.

5. Ambassador Toon initiated the U.S. side's presentation. He stated that the meetings he had attended the day before were useful, then mentioned General Volkogonov's appearance before the SSC, noting that he, Ambassador Toon, had been out of the country, but that he had received a video tape of the proceedings, which he had watched in full. Ambassador Toon complimented General Volkogonov on his presentation, stating that General Volkogonov's act of appearing, together with the quality of his testimony, lent strong credibility to the work of the Joint Commission and the U.S. and Russian governments. Ambassador Toon said, "As I have told you many times, we are grateful for your commitment and for President Yeltsin's. And, as I've told you many times and stated publicly, we are convinced that you and President Yeltsin are sincere in your desire to help. As we both know, this was not the case in the old Soviet Union. I made many appeals to Gromyko and Brezhnev, but they always said that the fact that you raised the issue of U.S. POWs means you want to sour U.S.-Russian relations. There is a great difference now when

we can come to a Russian leadership with the confidence of the Russian People." Ambassador Toon then shifted to the subject of the Commission's impending trip to Vladivostok, stating that he was grateful for General Volkogonov's assistance in arranging it and that he, Ambassador Toon, looked forward to the trip, which would begin later the same day. Ambassador Toon noted that, when he had served in Moscow, such a request to visit a secure facility such as the naval base at Posyet would have been unthinkable, let alone receiving consent the same day as the request was submitted. He then stated that, cooperation notwithstanding, there was still a minor difficulty, since the U.S. Consul in Vladivostok reported that the Russians preparing for the visit needed further instructions and authorizations from Moscow. General Volkogonov immediately answered that he had spoken with Vladivostok by telephone in the morning to resolve outstanding problems. Colonel Osipov interrupted and initiated a swift exchange in Russian with General Volkogonov, declaring that he, Colonel Osipov, had the situation in hand. General Volkogonov then assured Ambassador Toon that the problems would be clarified by the end of the day's session. General Volkogonov turned briefly to Colonel Osipov and said, "Fix it."

6. Ambassador Toon resumed his presentation by noting General Volkogonov's comment to the effect that not everyone in Russia shared the positive attitude of the members of the Commission toward cooperation with the U.S. and the POW issue. Ambassador Toon said, "I hope you can help remove these barriers which we both know exist, and I recognize it's difficult for some of your citizens to open up to former enemies. Some of our own agencies would be less than enthusiastic." General Volkogonov replied, "I spoke of the situation in society's attitude, which is divided into groups. There are people who are against Yeltsin. A group of delegates insists that we have more important problems to address in this country. I did not speak about the members of the Commission, but about our divided society." Ambassador Toon continued, "I hope you will make it clear to all that I'm not leading an intelligence operation or trying to assign guilt," and that the United States was solely interested in obtaining information to aid the surviving families of the service members in question.

7. Ambassador Toon then stated, "Regarding various areas of inquiry, I believe we can agree that, in respect to World War II, we have more or less satisfied the problem. We can put that problem behind us. But, as you know, we have been less successful in our work on Cold War aircraft shootdowns or on Korea or Vietnam. Perhaps some of the documents passed to us today will provide for some progress, but, as I told you, the American public will not understand it if we cannot tell them what happened to our Cold War fliers. If they were killed, tell us. If they were held as prisoners, tell us. Again, we will go over these documents and let you know our reaction. Now, as regards Korean War-era POWs, we feel--and I reserve judgment--we feel that there is enough evidence on hand to convince us that some U.S. POWs were transferred to the USSR. In our working sessions, we passed you information on this general subject that we had collected, and we hope it will help you in your work. Regarding Vietnam, our research teams here in Moscow and at home have been frustrated in their attempts to interview your diplomats and military men who served in Indochina. Some of the interviews you arranged for this trip were useful, and we hope this will continue."

8. General Volkogonov interjected, "If you have a concrete example of a problem, report it directly to me or to my assistant. In all such cases, you should come to me. On the other hand, I cannot force individuals to talk to you, if they do not want to."

9. Ambassador Toon resumed his presentation, remarking that he had told President Bush the U.S. side would prepare a report on what the Commission has accomplished and what we still hope to achieve in the coming months. "I have been told by the White House that this report will be passed on to President Clinton so that we can carry on our work, if both sides agree. I agree that we have made considerable progress and that our work has been useful in cementing the relationship between our governments. It will be my personal recommendation that we continue the work of the Commission so we can satisfy the American public. General, you mentioned your concern with your own POWs in Afghanistan. I think you know we are doing our best to help you." Ambassador Toon further stated that, during General Volkogonov's visit to Washington in November, the general had met with Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Scowcroft. "Here is a letter from Eagleburger on our efforts to find your POWs. Most recently, we have taken action to defuse one rebel threat to kill them. I'll hand this letter over to you." The Ambassador then passed said letter. At this point, Colonel Osipov moved from his

chair at the side of the room to stand behind General Volkogonov's shoulder in order to read the letter.

10. Ambassador Toon said, "We can do it now or later after the break, but, meanwhile, it would be helpful to us if you could provide us with files on the 87 men who remain in Afghan hands so we can speed up our efforts. Now General, if you don't object, I'd like to call on two of my colleagues who took part in yesterday's working session."

11. A Russian official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) interrupted and stated, "In this regard, the representatives from the American Embassy asking to interview those [Soviets] who worked in Vietnam mentioned Ambassador Vdovin. We asked our Vietnamese desk to get in touch with him and this was done. However, he declined to meet, he says he is not ready to do this. I feel the U.S. Embassy should contact him directly, this might be better. We also found another Ambassador, Scherbakov, but he is also unenthusiastic. He is now 80 years old, he has forgotten a lot. But you can see we are trying to support the Commission." Ambassador Toon asked, "Do you have any feeling for why they refuse?" The MFA official replied, "It's difficult to say, there are probably several reasons. They served in those years of the Cold War and therefore they still adhere to the old thinking." General Volkogonov interjected, "I will speak to them myself." Ambassador Toon said, "We defer our approach until we hear from you." General Volkogonov said, "I'll do it today or tomorrow."

12. Ambassador Toon called on Mr. Kauzlarich of the U.S. Department of State. Mr. Kauzlarich stated that, in the course of the previous day's work, the Commission representatives had gotten into considerable detail on the issue of Cold War shootdowns and the Korean War. Mr. Kauzlarich stressed the importance of clearing up the 10 Cold War shootdown cases identified by the U.S. as the highest priorities in this category. He noted that Colonel Osipov had been very helpful in reviewing information from the Russian side and that he, Mr. Kauzlarich, hoped the documents from which Colonel Osipov had read at the previous day's sessions would be passed to Ambassador Toon, since those documents provided the kind of detail needed to determine the fate of the aircrews. Mr. Kauzlarich noted that, regarding the Korean War, the U.S. side had been able to take advantage of the presence of two individuals from the Russian side who had been active participants in contemporary events [Colonel, Retired, Korotkov, of military intelligence, and Colonel, Retired, Orlov, of the air defense arm's electronic intelligence branch]. Mr. Kauzlarich noted that Mr. Quinn had continued those discussions into the early evening. Finally, Mr. Kauzlarich noted that, during the previous day's exchange, the representative of the Russian MOD, Colonel Mukhin, had raised not only the issue of Afghan POWs, but had requested U.S. assistance in resolving the fates of former airmen involved in alleged shootdowns of Soviet aircraft by the U.S. during the Cold War in the Arctic and in the vicinity of Alaska, as well as asking U.S. aid in the search for information about Soviet military advisers who had gone missing in trouble spots around the globe in the previous decades. Mr. Kauzlarich asked the Russian side to provide specific information to assist the U.S. side's effort to comply with these requests.

13. Ambassador Toon called upon Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, Mr. Kenneth Quinn. Mr. Quinn stated that, a few weeks after the Commission's September meeting in Moscow, he had traveled to Vietnam, where he found that the previous discussions with former Soviet diplomats proved very helpful. He stated, "I can assure you that we handled this in a sensitive manner so as not to cause problems with relations between Russia and Vietnam." Mr. Quinn stated that considerable progress had been made in Vietnam over the last six months because the Vietnamese had made available more information, people, and artifacts taken from U.S. Vietnam-era POWs. He stated that U.S. representatives had even interviewed a former prison guard who told of the execution of U.S. POW's. Mr. Quinn noted that such openness was "remarkable." Mr. Quinn said, "This allowed President Bush to take further normalization steps with Vietnam." Mr. Quinn emphasized that the next thirty days represented a great opportunity for U.S.-Vietnamese relations if still more information emerged about what happened during the war, noting that most of this information must, of course, come from the Vietnamese themselves. He added, however, that some small pieces of information, gleaned from sources similar to the interrogation questionnaires the Soviets held from the Korean War, might be in the possession of the Russian side. Mr. Quinn mentioned General Abramov as a source who has supplied useful information in the past. Mr. Quinn then thanked General Volkogonov for his personal assistance in such matters. Mr. Quinn stated that significant questions have been raised over the matter of possible transfers of U.S. POWs from Korea

to the former Soviet Union during the war. Mr. Quinn stated, "We provided you with a paper, in Russian, with information reaching from 1952 to the present, from a variety of sources [on this subject]. When this information is seen by the American public and Congress, it will be viewed as a compelling case that it happened, so we hope we can speedily investigate this together to determine whether it happened or not." Mr. Quinn then offered general thanks to the Russian side for their efforts, and specific thanks to Colonel (Ret.) Korotkov and Colonel (Ret.) Orlov for their participation in the previous day's sessions.

14. At this point, General Volkogonov announced that coffee was served and that the meeting would recess for fifteen minutes.

15. Upon the resumption of the meeting, General Volkogonov stated, "We will now exchange points of view. Ambassador Toon asked if he might call upon Dr. Peterson, the senior archivist for the U.S. side. Volkogonov assented.

16. Dr. Peterson stated that three issues needed to be addressed:

a. In Washington, D.C., in the spring, the issue was raised by the Russian government of eight U.S. citizens held as patients in former Soviet psychiatric hospitals. She stated that, at the June Commission meeting, the U.S. side asked for clarification as to the identities of these eight patients. Dr. Peterson stated that the U.S. side had yet to receive this clarification.

b. When the Commission came to Russia in May, representatives went to the Podolsk archives of the MOD and saw an "impressive project" which involved making card files on U.S. service members who had passed through repatriation camps at the close of WWII. Dr. Peterson stated that the Russian side had agreed, in May, to copy these files, either electrostatically or on microfilm, upon the completion of the project. She asked the present status of the project. The senior archivist from Podolsk, Colonel Brilov, stated that the project had been completed, but the question remained as to how best to copy the files. He recalled that the May discussions had raised the issue of computerization of the files, but, at present, the Podolsk archives did not even have adequate facilities to microfilm the file cards. He noted that the Russian side had worked primarily by hand on this project. Dr. Peterson stated that Task Force Russia would follow up on this issue with Colonel Brilov. General Volkogonov concurred that this would be the best approach.

c. Dr. Peterson stated that the U.S. side of the Commission had been handed three very important lists of names, the "510" list passed to Senator Smith in February 1992; the "71" list passed to the Commission in June; and the "59" list passed at the September meeting. Dr. Peterson stated that the analysis of the lists identified the names of six Korean War-era U.S. service members not returned to U.S. control. These six were Air Force crew members who were militarily active over North Korea. Dr. Peterson noted that, on 26 October, 1992, the U.S. side submitted a letter to the Russian side asking for the full source documentation on these six men, since the lists submitted by the Russian side bore no markings to identify their archival or organizational sources. She stressed the importance of this matter, and that it remained an unanswered request.

d. Dr. Peterson then turned to the matter of U.S. support to the Russian side, stating that, during his November visit to the U.S., General Volkogonov had asked for a number of documents related to Tashkent in WWII. Dr. Peterson presently handed over a full set of the documents requested to General Volkogonov, with photographs, and stated that a motion picture film also existed in relation to this material and that, should General Volkogonov, so desire, the U.S. side would be glad to provide a copy to him. General Volkogonov received the documents with thanks. At this time, a Russian representative asked that Dr. Peterson repeat her first question. Dr. Peterson restated the matter described at subparagraph 16.a above. Colonel Osipov then took the floor, stating that this matter of U.S. citizens in Soviet psychiatric hospitals only concerned people who were already repatriated after 1953 but who had, for one reason or another, been detained on Soviet territory for a while. Colonel Osipov stated that other documents showed that eight people were detained; that four individuals had mistakenly been called Americans but were, in fact, criminals of Soviet origin who had been spying for the U.S. He stated that the Russian side had checked all psychiatric hospital records, and that the answer as to U.S. citizens held

by them was negative. He stated that all eight names involved had been on a list passed to the U.S. side in September [Note: The U.S. side has no record of the receipt of such a list.] Colonel Osipov said that the Ministry of Public Health certifies that there are currently no U.S. citizens in Russian psychiatric hospitals, repeating that the Russian side of the Commission had verified all hospital archives. He stated that more than 40,000 files had been reviewed, and that citizens of various countries had been discovered, but no U.S. citizens. Colonel Osipov then addressed the Korean War lists submitted to the U.S. side, stating that the names on the lists had been received by the special services through their channels in Korea and China and that all of the people on the lists were held in Korea, not in the former USSR. He stated that the archival information was very fragmentary and did not address individual fates. He emphasized that the data already passed to the U.S. side was the sum of that held by the Russian side.

17. General Volkogonov, after insuring that Dr. Peterson had no further questions, stated that the U.S. was making progress with Vietnam because the war had been fought there. He asked if the U.S. had tried contacting the North Koreans. Mr. Quinn said, "Yes, there have been exchanges through the military commands of both sides. In particular, Senator Smith has had a dialog with North Korean officials which resulted in the return of some remains to the U.S. from North Korea." Mr. Quinn stated that there was an ongoing effort to have a further dialog with the North Koreans in the very near future. He emphasized, however, that such contacts remain very limited.

18. General Volkogonov said, "I would like to say a few words. Six years ago, I met with Kim Il Sung. The biggest topic there [North Korea] is still the Korean War. We didn't talk about U.S. citizens who were missing, that wasn't a topic then, but I visited a museum dedicated to the war and saw a large collection of documents and artifacts. There was a lot of material from aircraft. You should ask the North Koreans for access to this the written response. Maybe there was some mistake on the name." General Volkogonov then yielded the floor to Professor Orlov, who, in addition to his Korean War experience, is presently a government researcher.

24. Colonel Orlov said, "As General Volkogonov told you, a difficult part of our research has do with Cold War period shootdowns. Back then I worked on the air defense staff in Baku and then on the main air defense staff in Moscow. In this period, one of our missions was to fight such aircraft." He held up a Russian-language journal. "In this issue of New and Contemporary History, there is an article, "Secrets of the Closed Sky." I wrote this article in collaboration with Colonel-General Mikhailov, who was a military attache in the States in the '70's. We describe the events in which we took part, explaining the situation in the '50's and '60's. It's partly composed from our personal memories, partly from documentation. I want to give this copy to my military colleague, Colonel Herrington." At this point there is chatter in the meeting hall, and Ambassador Toon remarks, "I was in the Navy for five years in World War II."

25. General Volkogonov next recognized Colonel Mazurov of the Russian security services. Colonel Masyrov stated that, in the document handed over on the previous day by the U.S. side, he, Mazurov, had been mentioned as having telephoned Colonel (Ret.) Korotkov the night before the latter's second interview with Task Force Russia (TFR), with the implication in the U.S. document that he, Mazurov, had pressured Korotkov to make "corrections" in his testimony. Mazurov acknowledged that this problem arose because, in Korotkov's initial interview with TFR, Korotkov stated that he had interrogated U.S. POWs on former Soviet territory, while in the second interview Korotkov stated it might have been in Korea. Mazurov stated, "I exerted no pressure--if I wanted to exert pressure, I wouldn't do it by telephone, but by other means. I only wanted to insure that Korotkov gave true information. I called because the U.S. side claimed that Korotkov said POWs were transported to the USSR for interrogation. I asked the Secretary of the Russian Commission to show me the protocols of this session, but Tatyana [Koltovich] said she didn't participate and that the notes were not yet prepared. But Tatyana said Korotkov did not speak about this. Maybe Korotkov can say a few words about this."

26. Ambassador Toon stated, "If the implication that you applied pressure was unfounded, we apologize."

27. Colonel (Ret.) Korotkov rose and said, "The phone call was before the meeting, but there was no pressure. He was only interested in insuring I would attend the meeting and he asked me to tell the truth. There was not any pressure involved. I'm a professor and a military officer, I speak only about what I

know. No pressure was applied, and will not be. I'm glad Masyrov raised this question. This correctly underlines some differences in my previous testimony. In one case, I spoke about meeting a U.S. POW on Soviet territory, then refuted it. There was confusion about this, I think, because I was talking about being stationed in Khabarovsk and then that it was possible to meet Americans, but it didn't mean this happened in Khabarovsk. It occurred on territory that is ill-defined, there's no marking, you don't know to whom it belongs. It probably wasn't on Soviet territory."

28. Ambassador Toon replied, "We appreciate this clarification, and we'll be more careful with our language from now on."

29. Mazurov interjected. "We [security service representatives] even absented ourselves from the session yesterday with Orlov and Korotkov because we didn't want to influence their testimony."

30. General Volkogonov said, "If the new U.S. administration wants to continue, well, I'd like to say a few words. There are still unresolved questions. I think it best to carry on this work and hold our next meeting in February or March. I feel the main problem is to clarify aspects of the Cold War problem, the incidents of shootdowns. The 1953 incident off Vladivostok is not clear--we need to find the truth, we don't have it yet. We will return again to the Korean question because the U.S. side wants this and has supplied information, but we will only return to the issue of POW transfers to the USSR. I don't exclude that the closed KGB files could show something, that something may turn up in the Presidential Archives. One more time, my colleagues must verify all facts about POW transfers. And we must find an answer to the secrets of Sakhalin and the Kuril question. Perhaps Tokyo could help? Ask Tokyo for a response. We require some basis beyond the reports published in our press. As regards work, we should continue this on the level of our experts. I've already said that it wouldn't be bad to prepare a joint document or book on the subject of U.S. citizens--perhaps all documentation--on Soviet soil. It would be good politically and build trust between our peoples. This is an example of civilization, showing the importance of human rights. On the working level, we could address this problem and make a proposal by the next session. If you consider it necessary, we will continue our work."

31. Ambassador Toon replied, "General Volkogonov, as usual you've made a good proposal. You said a February-March meeting--I'm going to be gone, out of the country, for three weeks in March. February is too soon. I suggest April. We'll get back in touch with you."

32. General Volkogonov answered, "Acceptable. We can commit to April."

33. Ambassador Toon said, "I agree that work between experts should continue. The recommendation on the book of documents is very good. And we'll talk to the Japanese, see if there's proof on the graves. We'll revisit this issue."

34. General Volkogonov received a note and said, "There's no problem with the visit to Vladivostok. It's just that there's a critical fuel problem there, but it's not linked to your flight. You will be received without problems. And now there is the press conference, in fifteen minutes or SO."

35. This concluded the Plenary Session. These notes were taken by a U.S. Army officer Russian linguist assigned to Task Force Russia and were verified by other language-capable TFR members who were present.

TFR certifies that all paraphrased remarks are accurate in full detail as heard, and that all direct quotations have been reported with complete accuracy as heard.

ANNEX C TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA REPORT FOR 30 JANUARY 1993

1. Task Force Russia released 21 documents through the U.S. Air Force Casualty Affairs office in January, 1993. They were compiled by the U.S. Department of State on the shootdown of an RB-50 on 29 July 1953.

2. The documents came from Records Group 59, Lot 64 D551, Box 33, in the National Archives. They were declassified specifically for this release.

a. Deposition of Captain Roche, 14 May 1954, Declassified.

b. "Lone Survivor" by Captain John E. Roche no date, Unclassified.

c. Interview of Captain John Roche by General Weyland Regarding [the] RB-50 Incident of 29 July 1953, 31 July 1953, Declassified.

d. Deposition of Malcolm Barney Wade, 30 November 1953, Declassified.

e. Deposition of Edwin P. Gourley, 2 December 1953, w/Mission Report, Declassified.

f. Deposition of Kenneth E. Kimpling, 17 November 1953, Declassified.

g. Deposition of Harold W. Kerr, 3 December 1953, Declassified.

h. Deposition of Richard H. Hinz, 5 December 1953, Declassified.

i. Opinion of Captain Ralph A. Lerch, 15 April 1955, Declassified.

j. Mission Report 3-37-1- 29 July 1953, 37th ARS, 3 August 1953, Declassified.

k. COMDR FEAF Message, 010301Z August 1953, Declassified.

l. "Check List of Things Remaining to Be Done," Samuel Klaus, undated, Declassified.

m. COMFEAF Red Line Message, V 0319, Personal for White From Weyland, undated, Declassified.

n. 6161 AB WG Message, 291220Z July 1953, Declassified.

o. COMDR FEAF Message, 300124Z July 1953, Declassified.

p. "Annexes set up for Tongrenny's Printing," series of 6 pages; random cites of loss and SAR of RB-50 incident of 29 July 1953, including handwritten notes from Samuel Klaus, contemporary to the incident.

q. Deposition of Ralph Z. Schneider 4 December 1953, with mission report, Declassified.

r. Office Memorandum, Mr. Klaus, "Status of Overflight Cases," 9 September 1955, Declassified.

s. Memorandum, Mr. Klaus, "1955-1956 Work of Office," 5 January 1956 Declassified.

t. Moscow Note No. 42, "Missing American Airmen," undated, no original classification.

u. Office Memorandum, Mr. Klaus, "Soviet Detention of US Aircraft Incident Survivors," 20 July 1956, downgraded from "For Official Use Only."